Perception And Reality: A Lethal Divide

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An Introduction

Here in The CP Journal, we talk a lot about getting left of bang as a means of ensuring our personal survival and safety. The benefit of this concept, however, goes well beyond this single factor, and our ability to proactively recognize threats also has an impact on the people who live in the areas where we work. Dangerous situations are characterized by having a very limited time available to decide on a course of action. Because of that limitation, we naturally reduce the number of options that we even consider to be viable when in these situations. In the defense, law enforcement and security sectors, this often times leaves us with no other choice than to use very aggressive and decisive force when our safety is on the line. I’m certainly not saying that aggressive action is wrong, and sometimes it is a necessity in order to protect ourselves. However, there is a difference between actions that are necessary and actions that are ideal. In situations that result in a last resort decision, the cause can often be traced back to late recognition of the threat. When we are operating either at bang or right of bang, we are unable to consider the second and third order effects of our actions because of the immediacy of the situation we face. However, the public’s perception of our nation’s protectors is oftentimes shaped and influenced by aggressive tactics and the negative fallout that comes with them. Getting left of bang improves our ability to more thoroughly consider the far-reaching consequences of our actions.

As we strive to continually build upon the support of those we seek to protect, the earlier we can recognize individuals who intend to harm others provides opportunities to reduce the risk of alienating the public. This includes ways that ensures officer safety and considers the impact our actions will have on the viewing, and often critical, public. In situations such as these, the difference between the factors that guided your decisions and the way they are perceived by the public is something that all members of the military, law enforcement officers and private security professionals face. For example, let’s say a squad of Marines deployed overseas is pinned down in a residential compound by machine gun fire from a nearby building, and they decide that their only way out of this ambush is to bomb the building the insurgents are using for protection. While they know that their decision to destroy the house is based on the fact that they can’t move without getting shot, the only thing that the local villagers returning after the battle see is another house destroyed by American firepower. Even with an explanation to the affected parties and monetary reparations, this bombing has the ability to reinforce the perception created by the Taliban that Americans are targeting civilians and their livelihood. People often see the effect, not the cause. Would the decision be different if the Marines identified the insurgents a few hundred yards further away and were therefore in a less risky position? Maybe, but how to respond in that situation is a decision for the guy on the ground to make. However, with earlier recognition, there would certainly have been more options available to him, more time to consider what would lead to the best way forward and consider the impact that their actions would have on the locals, whose support is vital in a counter-insurgency fight. Being left of bang provides access to opportunities and options that being right of bang takes away.

The conditions of cause and effect exist for law enforcement officers operating here in the states as well as private security professionals operating around the world. The mandate to protect and serve is a double-edged sword. Sometimes aggressive action is needed to ensure your own safety but it also runs the risk of leading to a negative perception of your effectiveness and abilities. I’m
certainly not saying that decisive action is never required, but when the perception of our actions is a great deal different than the reality of the situation, it can lead to an irreparable rift and divide between our nation’s protectors, and those we are tasked with protecting.

The theme this e-book is focused on perception of another kind: how well we have secured the areas that we are tasked with protecting. When we fail to make honest and objective assessments about our security posture, we expose ourselves to attacks from an unseen enemy that has found and exploited our vulnerabilities before we could plug those gaps. We start with an article that talks about the danger of a school believing they have created a secure anchor point, but actually treating the building as a habitual area. We set out to ensure security providers can make honest assessments about an anchor point, test their own security measures, and find new ways to further enhance their own safety.

Most of the time perception is reality and, whether we like that fact or not, it is the world that we live in. While it can be frustrating at times when our good intentions are misinterpreted and our words are twisted in the public’s eye, the worst situation you can find yourself in is one where there are only a few options available and none of them are ideal. When we are aware of our own abilities, limitations and how outsiders see our actions, we can recognize situations for what they are and shape the outcome that we hope to attain. We hope with this issue of The CP Journal, we can take a look at ourselves and consider how well we are doing our jobs.

Thanks for reading and welcome to The CP Journal.

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School Security: A Dangerous Contradiction

By: Lanny Roark

As summer approaches its close, schools across the country will again be welcoming students back onto campus. In some locations, great effort on the part of school administrators, teachers and security professionals has been undertaken to assuage the apprehension and fear of parents and students alike in regard to criminal activity within the confines of a learning environment. However, one basic error concerning an overarching principle in security will repeatedly be made by administrators, despite their best attempts to secure our schools. Schools will be thought of, and viewed, as anchor points, but will be treated as habitual areas. This contradiction leads to the establishment of security gaps, which create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threats.

A habitual area is a location where people come and go with little inhibition or restriction. It is a location where people are generally welcomed and frequent often and repeatedly. People generally feel comfortable and move about in an inviting and relaxed environment. Habitual areas are generally created by a proxemic pull into the area, allowing people to meet a need. A shopping mall is a good example of a habitual area. Generally, it is the attitudes and actions of people within the physical space that make a place a habitual area.

Conversely, an anchor point is a location where only a certain group of people are normally allowed to operate in and would feel comfortable doing so. Individuals who are not a part of the pre-established group would not be welcomed in the anchor point. Anchor points provide safe haven and a sense of increased comfort and security for those who are part of a specific group or subset, but only to the extent that the anchor point is secured and defended. Anchor points are a “base of operations” allowing selected individuals or groups to operate in a controlled environment with familiar people with common goals and objectives. There is also a proxemic pull for anchor points, but only for those who are a part of the group allowed in the location. Unlike habitual areas, there is also a proxemic push away from the area for the unwelcomed that are not a part of the group. Like the habitual area, it is to a large extent the attitudes and actions of those within the anchor point that defines it as such.

The physical setting does also contribute to the establishment and identification of a habitual area or an anchor point. Physical security measures such as fences, gates, the layout of walkways, lighting and entry points, help define the area and set the mood, tone, and expectation of those entering and operating within the area. The addition of iconography (signage, symbols, markings and writings) communicating the belief, association and principles of those operating in the area can paint an accurate picture of who is welcome, what criteria must be met and the operating mores within the area.

Schools, perhaps more than ever, need to be anchor points. Past acts of horrendous violence make this point undeniable. However, simply believing or stating that a location is an anchor point doesn’t make it so. It’s dangerous to declare a place to be an anchor point or have a belief that it is, yet operate it as a habitual area. This creates false bravado, diminishes our situational awareness and impedes our ability to spot anomalies.
Patrick Van Horne talks about an experience that illustrates this point beautifully. After the shooting last winter in Newtown, CT, Pat had scheduled a meeting with school officials to discuss training aimed at increasing situational awareness, and thus overall school security. Pat was to meet with the school officials at the school in question. The school officials, after meeting with Pat, boasted about the security measures they had already put in place. They took great pride in explaining to Pat the high degree of safety, security and control they had implemented. They questioned the need for Pat’s expertise and the training he could provide.

What those school officials did not know was that Pat had arrived early because he wanted to find the exact location of the meeting within the school and didn’t want to be late. Pat was able to enter the school grounds, wander the halls and corridors in a number of directions, and essentially had full access to the school. Pat went unchallenged, unencumbered and uninhibited throughout the school until finally finding the specific meeting place. Whatever measures they may have taken to bolster security did nothing to make the school more secure against a potential intruder. Their actions only caused them to believe they had created an anchor point, when in reality they had not. As a result, they were lulled into a false sense of security.

A baseline can be much easier to establish in an anchor point, and thus, anomalies are more easily forced to the surface and recognized than in a habitual area because there are less variables. Anchor points by their very nature are more controlled and regulated. There is often a higher level of expectation in regard to appearance, behavior, customs and practices. It doesn’t take a long period of time, or much observation, to spot the sisters from a local convent who wander into an outlaw biker bar.

The same principle applies to our schools, but only to the extent we are willing to truly establish schools as an anchor point and put the measures and practices in place that establish it as so. Pat probably wasn’t challenged or even given a second look as he walked unfettered through the school because of the mistaken notion that anyone on the school grounds must belong there and / or someone has already “cleared” the subject. If we aren’t willing to defend schools as anchor points, and make clear through deeds, not just words, that only a preselected group of people are welcome, then there is no point in even considering it an anchor point.

Well-intentioned people will most times follow the protocol of school entry. Those with ill intent certainly will not. In fact, they will look for the gap in security measures caused by the incongruence between believing the school to be an anchor point, but operating like a habitual area. Here are some key questions to ask to check for those security gaps.

- Are check in and checkout procedures well established and followed consistently for every visitor?
- Do teachers, administrators and other school staff feel empowered to challenge anyone they don’t personally recognize? Are they required to do so?
- Of those individuals that are personally recognized, do school staffers still inquire as to the purpose of their presence?
- Are there requirements in place regarding what can and cannot be carried onto the campus by visitors? Are there measures in place to check bags, boxes, etc.?
- Has the concept of defense in depth been employed? Has a buffer zone around and leading up to the anchor point been established?
• Is there a means by which to quickly and clearly identify bona fide visitors from strangers from a distance and upon first glance?
• Is a consistent message being sent about how welcome a stranger may feel simply entering the school grounds by way of iconography, the physical setting and placement of fences, gates, entry ways, walkways, foliage, lighting, and the actions, attitude and demeanor of school personnel?

Perhaps most importantly, school personnel must be trained in how to quickly establish a baseline for their school for any given day, time of day, or special event, and then spot the anomalies that rise above or fall below that baseline. School personnel must be able to spot those behavioral threat indicators displayed by an individual before a full incursion of the anchor point can unfold and develop.

The defense of an anchor point relies on being proactive, not reactive. Too many schools rely heavily on reactive measures to preserve life and property after a dynamic event has unfolded. A true anchor point exists because those that occupy it have made it clear that those not part of the group are unwelcome, creating a proxemic push from the area.

Schools need to be anchor points for our students, teachers and staff, so that teaching and learning flourishes in an environment of safety and security, absent of the threat of violence. We must establish them as such. Teachers and staff need to be adept at observing and searching for anomalous behavior. We must train them to do so. Schools need to be operating left of bang. We must get them there, and keep them there.

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Identifying Anchor Points and Insiders With Violent Intent

By: Patrick Van Horne

The dynamic of territoriality and how that concept leads to the creation of anchor points plays a critical role in the professional lives of our nation’s protectors. Anchor points are the areas where we keep the things that are important to us and, therefore, they require the most security. For observers, understanding how two key characteristics of anchor points – how they are created and how people interact with them - provides the opportunity to make objective assessments and predictions about the people within the places you visit. The first characteristic, how people establish ownership of an area, empowers our military and police forces to locate the areas that criminals, insurgents and terrorists use to plan their operations and strike them in their own backyard. The second characteristic, how people interact with established anchor points, allows all members of the security and defense industries to better evaluate the people attempting to access restricted areas.
Before we can take this concept of identifying anchor points from theory to tangible real life scenarios, the initial requirement is to understand what differentiates anchor points from habitual areas. We will do this by analyzing two video clips. The first video is taken inside the entrance to a Target store and the second clip is focused on the people entering a Costco. Start by watching each of these clips through one time to get a basic understanding of the behaviors we will be discussing.

We should start by realizing that both of these stores are very similar as they both offer customers a wide variety of food and household items to shop for. However, the difference between the two lies in the customers who are allowed into the store and are able to actually shop there. Target is open to all shoppers. No one is refused entry, making it a habitual area. Even though we might know this from our own experiences, what allows us to classify Target as a habitual area is the fact that there is no one near the entrance with the purpose of keeping certain people out. Even if we knew nothing about American retail, we could observe those entering the store and recognize the store’s status as a habitual area because everyone is entering and no one is checking to see whether they are “on the list.” No one is controlling access.

Costco, on the other hand, is not a habitual area. Costco is an anchor point because it limits access to its wholesale priced goods only to Costco members. Even just that word – membership – helps us to identify areas that are going to be treated as anchor points by showing that there is some form of exclusivity involved. Costco places an employee right at the entrance of the store in order to ensure that only the customers with the right credentials get in. For Costco, the requirement for entry is that the person must prove that they are a paying member, both at the entrance of the store and again when checking out. People who meet this standard are allowed in without delay, while those that fail to are challenged and turned away.

Identifying anchor points that aren’t well known requires that security professionals learn to recognize two of the characteristics of anchor points. We will do this by analyzing the video taken inside Costco and assessing the behavior of the people through two different lenses. One lens is focused on the person controlling access and the other is focused on the people walking into the store.
The First Lens – Analyzing The Bouncer

The first lens is focused on the top priority of security plans, which is to keep outsiders from gaining entry. To do this, we observe that Costco complements their physical security measures, such as limiting the number of access points to the building to just the one front entrance, with a “bouncer” at that location to check the credentials of those coming in. With the same role of the bouncer tasked with keeping people under 21 out of a dive bar, this guy’s job is to keep non-members from coming in.

Recognizing the bouncer’s behavior helps police officers seeking to identify criminal anchor points – the hideouts and bases that criminals, gang leaders, drug dealers, and terrorist cells use to plan their operations from. Since not all anchor points are going to be as well known as Costco, whenever you observe a person filling a similar role of the “bouncer,” or people approaching a building that you would have considered to be a public space that are turned away, you can focus your collections on these important areas.

The Anticipated Baseline: Knowing that anchor points must enforce their exclusivity, I approach this store with the expectation that the baseline for the entrance of Costco consists of a bouncer who should be displaying cues from the dominant cluster. In order to keep outsiders out, he can’t be acting submissively. This role requires dominance, which is the “security answer” for restricting access. However, at the same time the “security answer” needs to be weighed against the business needs of the store. At Costco, the bouncer is a customer-facing role and the first line of service, so he needs to do his job in a way that doesn’t unnecessarily anger people. So I expect this dominance to be tempered.

The Observed Behavior: As we look at how the bouncer goes about his job, we can see that, for the most part, the dominance of the bouncer is pretty subtle. Early in the clip, after he has let a few parties through the entrance without showing their ID, it seems that his main focus is on counting the number of customers who enter the store on the device he has in his left hand, instead of checking the IDs of those entering. However, while the ID itself is not something that he would stop people at the door for, when an elderly man tries to enter the store with a box of Cheerios in his cart, the “bouncer” steps forward to stop the man from entering. Only after conversation does he decide to let the man in.

Why These Observations Matter: As Lanny Roark highlights in his article “School Security – A Dangerous Contraction,” it isn’t just the desire to keep outsiders out, but the willingness to enforce the security measures that you have in place that makes an area secure. While the process of checking all the membership cards isn’t something that the “bouncer” seems overly interested in, Costco also has established a defense in depth, creating multiple redundant layers of observation to ensure that only members can make purchases from the store. At the checkout point, if a customer does not have an ID card, they aren’t going to be allowed to buy what they have in their cart. Because of this built in depth, the store manager at Costco can comfortably reduce the level of security at the entrance, by not just assuming that everyone in the store has proven themselves a member. As Roark states, for schools to be established as legitimate anchor points teachers and staff can’t simply assume that everyone in the school has been cleared as a legitimate visitor. Teachers and staff need to serve as redundant layers of security to ensure that only those with a legitimate reason for being the school are allowed in.
Through The Second Lens – The Insiders

Whereas the first lens was focused on the person responsible for establishing the anchor point, the second lens is focused on how the bouncer influences the behavior of the people approaching and entering the anchor point. The bouncer serves as an authority figure, which will have predictable and observable effects on the customers. For the security professionals tasked with securing office buildings, sporting events or doing close protection for VIPs, being able to understand the influence that authority figures have on people with legitimate credentials and those without them are critical observations.

The Anticipated Baseline: As people approach the entrance to Costco, I expect them to display signs of comfort and familiarity. I come to this conclusion because customers are told when they sign up for a membership to show their ID card when they come in, so there shouldn’t be any surprises when they approach the store. Likewise, customers who have visited the store in the past have gone through this process before. Knowing the process and knowing what to expect should reduce the perception of anything threatening, which will cause comfortable and familiar behavior.

The Observed Behavior: As we look at how people are actually entering Costco, there are a few different patterns that emerge. Most people act exactly as we anticipated, having their membership ID card ready and walking in at a relaxed pace. Deviations from this baseline are situational, but are easily explained. For example, there is one group that hesitates to enter while the bouncer talks to the elderly man bringing the box of Cheerios into the store. They are showing submissiveness as they wait for permission to enter before proceeding in. Even though we didn’t state this submissiveness in the anticipated baseline, once we observe that behavior we can add it to our baseline, thus making it more thorough.

What Might Attract Your Attention: Now that this baseline has been established, the bouncer can begin to mentally simulate what behavior he should be observing that would signify an anomaly. A security guard can ask himself ahead of time why a person who had their card ready would be uncomfortable in this situation? The guard can also be asking himself what questions he could pose to that person in a non-intrusive manner to confirm the reason for the observed behavior. He can ask himself why a person who had their ID card ready would be showing unfamiliar cues upon entering the store. He can ask himself how he would respond if a person approached in a submissive way, showing their ID card but unable to make eye contact. The observations that the bouncer is searching for are not the behaviors associated with the baseline, but the behaviors that he anticipates would cause a person to stand out. By preparing for these different situations he can reduce the time needed to take action. This implication is why the second characteristic of anchor points, how people interact with the authority figure, is so important.

Regardless of your purpose for assessing the people around an anchor point, how quickly observers can establish the baseline determines the speed at which anomalies can be identified. Learning to identify the two characteristics of anchor points, how a bouncer establishes control over the points of entry and how people interact with that authority figure, are what provide trained observers with the information needed to separate the criminal attempting to blend in with the crowd that surrounds him.

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How I Break Down A Video – A White Board Discussion

By: Patrick Van Horne

The following is a transcription of a video that was done by Speechpad. We recommend that you watch the video, but if you prefer to read a transcription, please understand the difficulty in transcribing an unscripted presentation and ignore any grammatical errors that are unavoidable during such a transcription.

After I shoot a video that I'm going to use on either the journal's practice pages for subscribers to practice establishing a baseline on, or for a class I'm about to teach, I go through a very systematic and detailed process to break down those videos after I shoot them. This is to make sure that the process that I'm using is thorough and I'm not missing anything within that video clip.

I want to pass this on to subscribers so you guys can take video of the areas that are important to you, so you can go through whether it's surveillance footage or something that you shoot yourself, and establish a baseline for the different areas that you operate in, the same way that we do them here on the journal pages.

I like video because it provides a way to go through in a very repetitious manner to either focus on specific behaviors that we're looking to observe or build habits out of processes that we need to observe the people that are around us. And recognize criminals whether that's here in the states or insurgents and terrorists overseas.
The reason I go through a very systematic process is because when I come home after shooting the video, I usually have no idea what's on the clip itself. Which is the reason I start by watching the video through its entirety three different times. I'm usually so focused on the people that are around me are trying to not get caught filming one of these public areas that I usually don't know what's on the video itself until I come home and watch it.

The reason I go through the video three times when I first start analyzing and assessing the behaviors that are shown on the video is because I want to focus on three different sections of the clip. The first time through, I focus only on the people and the objects and behaviors that are closest to the camera. The second time through, I'll identify a middle section of the clip. And the third time through I'll focus only on the people and behaviors; everything that is going on at the deepest part of the clip.

And I do this for a reason. As I'm trying to focus on the people that are a little deeper into the frame. If I was to get distracted by something that's occurring closer to me, I might miss some important cues that are going on on the backside of the clip. And so, by focusing only on one of these three sections at a time, I make sure that nothing happens and I'm observing all the behaviors, all the people throughout the entire clip.

Once I go through and watch it three times and have a good understanding of what's happening throughout this video, I go through a very systematic process which you may have seen in some of the practice videos for establishing a baseline. The first thing I do here is I'm trying to establish a baseline and I'm simply asking myself, "What's going on in this frame?" That's what's normal here, that's what the baseline is. So, I start by just asking myself "What's going on in this clip?" There's a few different things that I look at in order to establish that baseline.

The first thing I do when I come into an area is I'm looking at is what we classify as the collective mood of everyone and everything present. If you downloaded the cluster cards from the CPJ Library, you can see that all of the different observations that we make, whether we're observing individuals or how people relate to their surroundings. And in this situation, how people relate to the collective mood of everyone present.

I start off by making observations that you'll see under either positive or negative atmospherics that are listed on the "other indicators" section. I'm looking to see noise level. The sense of cleanliness, the order, the disorder, the activity level of what's going on in this area. This is something that you observe naturally and intuitively when you come into a new area. It lets you make very quick assessments about how people are perceiving their personal safety.

Once I make a quick judgment about the atmospherics of the area, I then move up on that card and look at all the observable domains of behavior, all the indicators that I should see if it's positive or negative atmospherics. These become my expectations. So, in my first, real search through the scene, I'm looking to see if everyone here clearly matches the behaviors that I'm looking for in positive atmospheres. Or I'm looking to see if anyone clearly stands out from that anticipated and expected baseline.

Because this is not very thorough at this point, it's going to be a very hasty search. I'm looking for the people who will very clearly stand out from the baseline. So, before I spend time going into a more detailed and dedicated search of the area, I need to know if there are possible threats that I need to focus my attention on right away.
Once I have done that first search, that hasty search using the atmospherics, I'm now ready to go in and begin to establish a more detailed baseline. To do this, I'm going to look at the process and the patterns that people establish and people display when they come into that area. To set this up, I take a look at the area as a whole. I'm determining if the place that I'm in is a habitual area or an anchor point. If it is either one, I'm looking to see if there's any smaller anchor points within this setting, I then need to be aware of, I need to take into consideration. I'm looking at the pathways. How are people moving about the area? This lets me start to figure out once someone comes into this area, where are they going and how are they getting there?

Now that I have this layout, I go into the very detailed and systematic search of the process that people go through. If you're to look at either the Starbucks video or the McDonald's video or really, any of the clips that we have on the journal pages, you'll see that I establish a process. First, a person does this. Then, they move to here. Then they go on to step three, step four, and they ultimately leave the area. This is going to provide the context that I need to begin observing very specific elements of behavior.

I'm going to go through and watch all of the people coming through in each of those different steps in the process and identify a cluster of behavior that fits the people that I'm observing. People in line are very comfortable in this setting. When people order, I'm looking for dominant behavior. I'm looking for what's normal, using one of the clusters of individual behavior to again, establish this baseline.

This first question of what's going on here. As you'll see in the practice and the baseline videos, this is Monday and Tuesday of the week. This is the first step, the first thing I'm asking myself. "What's going on here?" I'm looking at it from the customer perspective. If you apply this concept overseas, you're not looking for threats right now, you're not looking for what the criminal is doing, you're looking to assess what the population, what the civilians are doing. So, in case they have an advanced warning on something or say they know a threat or an attack is imminent, their behavior might help you realize that there's something wrong before you've identified that criminal, that attacker themselves. So, this first part of the process lets me really focus on the customers – the people who are interacting with this environment who don't work there, who aren't there all the time. That's the first step.

Once we get to Wednesday, when I start to break down the video, the next layer of observations that I'm making, I'm just simply asking myself "What am I missing by only looking at the customers? What am I missing when I'm looking only at the people who have entered this bar or this restaurant to sit down and eat?" I start by looking at who has access to the different areas. If there's an anchor point; customers are not allowed to go behind the McDonald's counter. I'm looking to see the people who can go behind the counter into that anchor point. What are they wearing? How are they behaving? How is their presence responded to by the people who are already within that anchor point?

This is going to let me focus my observations a little bit more on not only the customer side of the equation, but the complete picture. I'm looking to see who is familiar or unfamiliar with the area. Sometimes, this relates just to customers. Sometimes, this observation relates to everyone involved. But I'm starting to look at who's familiar, who's unfamiliar? Who's in the crowd of people? And then just starting to ask myself why? Why are these behaviors important? Why is this person's presence important here?
And by answering all these different questions on what's going here and what am I missing, I'm starting to, again, systematically build my understanding. And at this point, it's become a pretty complete, pretty in-depth understanding of what's normal in this environment.

Once I know what's normal here, I can now begin to focus my observation on who stands out? This is a bit of a trick when it comes to video because I didn't contact, I didn't recognize any anomalies while I was there or filming it. Otherwise, I would've tried to find a reason to contact them and confirm my observations. Because I'm looking at the people around me, I'm trying not to get punched in the face while I'm recording people in this public area, I don't have the ability to confirm any of the anomalies that I find once I'm watching it in a video. But I want to complete the process because as we start to make this a habit, once we establish a baseline, we're now going to begin proactively hunting for that anomaly. And I want to make sure I'm building this part of the observation process into my habits, so that I can do it intuitively and quickly when I'm on scene and I'm doing this in real situations.

So, as I watch the video, I'm just looking for an anomaly. I'm going through this process of how people are behaving in each step along the way. And I'm looking for one person who stands out. I'm going to then communicate specifically why. Why did this person attract my attention? And then communicate using as many of the terms, as many cues as possible to explain why this person stood off in the baseline.

We live in a day and age where simply identifying someone as an anomaly is not good enough anymore. We have to be able to communicate why. We have to justify our actions. And so this is part of the process and part of the learning of making sure that once I identify an anomaly, I'm communicating very specifically, using the scientific terms that we talked about on the site or in class to justify why this person attracted my attention.

Again, one of the reasons we use behavior analysis is because we're not focused on race, we're not focused on religion. We're not focused on any of those inaccurate indicators. We're looking at how behavior causes us to focus on specific people.

Once I've identified an anomaly and once I've justified my reason why, I'm now going to begin preparing for the contact. So, if I was in person, if I was observing this in real time, what information could I pick up about that person that I could use to establish some control questions or create a reason for approaching that? I'll watch the video through and I'm focused only on this one person. I'm trying to find every fact that I can about this person. Why are they there? What sort of behavior have they been exhibiting? What type of clothing are they wearing? Do they have any tattoos that show me their beliefs or affiliations? Do they have kids with them? Are they with a group of people?

All the different things that I can pull and assess about this one person. So, if I was to go contact them, I'm incorporating behavior into my actual observation and decision-making process. We're not observing for the sake of observation. The goal is to use this as part of our normal, operational routines when we're on patrol, when we're on the streets. When we're observing and trying to search for those threats.

So, I make sure that as I'm going through this process, I'm doing everything as I would if it was in real-life. So, that we're building those good, solid-habits that when we're out there, we're not forgetting things, we're not trying to shortcut the process unnecessarily.
This takes us through Monday through Thursday of the different observations we make each day of the week in the baseline videos. Friday is a chance for you to go from making these observations in front of a computer, on your iPad, however you're watching this video. And take those observations from theory and make them practical for you. If we're observing the McDonald's scenario, go to a fast food restaurant that's near you. Burger King, a KFC, a Taco Bell, whatever it is. Take this baseline that we've established over the course of the week and go out to this area and confirm what we've identified, the behaviors that we observe and see how they apply in your specific setting.

There are some things that are going to be similar, some things that are going to be different. The goal is to figure out how this applies to your life and the areas that you visit. And if you only look at it on video, if you never take it to the areas that you actually visit, you might never transition this concept into your long-term memory as part of that process of your observation. So, make sure that once you're done watching the video Friday or over the weekend, go out to the field, go to these areas and practice making the observations.

There's a few reasons we go through this process. One, we can talk about mental priming. And so, by reading through this baseline before you go to the area, you're preparing yourself, mentally, to start observing. That helps. We start to systematically build the file folders for specific cues that we want to observe. And not only those specific cues, but also, the process of observing an area so that we can do it as effectively as possible.

As I mentioned, the goal of all of this is not for you just to come to the site and practice on the videos that we have, but also, to take these skills and these observations. And use them to pass on these lessons to maybe some of the officers that you recruit or are mentoring. Make yourself more effective on patrol. And that's going to require some effort on your part to practice over and over again.

So, by outlining this process, you can take the video that you have of your area. Whether that's here in the states or somewhere overseas or take surveillance footage of building that your task was securing. And establishing a baseline for that area, so you can begin to notice all the different cues that might cause someone to stand out.

As you're going through it, there's a few keys to success that I want to bring up to make sure you're getting the most out of your video, getting the most of how you break down a video. The first is to establish a baseline. We always want to find the criminal. That's the goal. We want to find that attacker before they conduct the attack. And behavior will cause them to stand out from the baseline but to stand out, you have to stand out from something. That is that baseline.

So, the more time we spend building our habits, on establishing a baseline, going through this process of a hasty search and then a deliberate search through the areas. We're going to build a foundation we need to do this very quickly and very accurately. We don't want to spend an unnecessary amount of time when we're on scene analyzing the baseline. That'll take too long and we risk a criminal observing us before we can identify him. So, by doing this ahead of time, by going through this process and videos, make sure that you're using the building habits and building that foundation, so you can do this very quickly and very accurately once you're on scene.

The second key to success here is use the cluster cards. Download them from the CP Journal's library and here's why. Let's say you're observing a video and you recognize someone as
uncomfortable. You probably have a couple of cues from the uncomfortable cluster that you pick up on very quickly. And there's probably some other cues that the person is giving off that you haven't noticed; they're not the observations that you routinely make.

So, by going down the list of possible observations that relate to uncomfortable behavior, as you're observing that person, you're going to start to pick up on more and more cues that cause you to classify them as uncomfortable. This helps you in other settings when maybe you're preferred observation is not there. But you notice one of the more minor cues that you started to learn and build on through the videos.

So, make sure you use the cluster cards. They're always being updated to make sure they have as many observations as possible. And the goal is to really build a file folder not just for one specific cue that you're comfortable with. But for as many possible cues, so you can recognize the behavior and classify it, again, as quickly and as accurately as you can.

The third thing is, you want to be objective when you're looking at people. When you find the anomaly and you start to communicate what's causing them to stand out, you're going to be tempted to start to look for the cause, the reason their behaviors attracted your attention. If you only look at uncomfortable people and say, "They're uncomfortable because they are not familiar with this area. They've never been in this food court before. They don't travel often, so they stand out in a baseline for an airport." And if you only look at non-criminal reasons why someone might behaving that way, you'll never see why someone would act that way for criminal reasons. And at the same time, if you look at every single person's who's uncomfortable and say, "That's a threat. They're trying to conceal their intentions. They're smuggling some sort of weapon. They're trying to avoid detection and they're very uncomfortable because of it." If you only look at it through the lens of "Everyone's a criminal," you'll never see the people who are behaving that way without that criminal intent.

Look at every observation that you make from both lenses. This is going to help you be very objective when you're looking at the reasons, the causes, the triggers that are triggering the behavior that you're actually observing. Especially when you're going through a video. When you don't have the ability to confirm your observations. When you don't have the ability to contact someone and try to determine why they're behaving a certain way. This is absolutely important.

So, that, again, as you build the habits, you're much more relaxed when you're watching it on video. You can think through the process, think through the reasons in a much more coherent way than you can when you're on scene, when there is more stress. When you're trying to do things in real-time. So, make sure that when you're doing the video, you're being as objective as possible.

The goal of all this as I said, is to master the process. And that's why we keep putting videos up. So far, it's been mostly habitual areas that we've established the baseline for. But we're beginning to build some videos now for anchor points so that we can establish that practice and establish that baseline for as many of the different areas that you visit. We want to make this a process, so that we can take something we learn and really make it a habit in front of the computer when there is no threat to us. So, when we're on scene, we can do it very quickly and very accurately.

By making this a process and making sure it's repeatable, this allows us to make sure that as we go through these videos, we're not missing anything. So, when we're tired, when we're hungry,
when we have the tendency to take a mental shortcut and skip over something. By going through a detailed process, especially when we're practicing, we make sure that we're not taking those shortcuts and making a mistake, that can have some serious consequences when we're doing it on scene. So, make sure, especially in video that you're going through a full, repeatable process.

The other reason is thorough. As I said, we're not missing anything. You're looking at all the behaviors, all the people through these clips to make sure that you're not only focusing on the very obvious people. You're also identifying the subtleties that again, could help you go from observing the area as a whole, to focusing on the specific people who require your attention. And the more often you do that, as you build those file folders, as you build that database of experience that lets you recognize people and predict their actions very quickly, it's a process that can become very fast. It's a process that can become very intuitive. But it takes practice, it takes some dedicated practice to make this a habit.

And once it's a habit and you're doing this both consciously and unconsciously, taking your lessons from the computer and applying them in the field, that's when this is going to really pay off for you. So, you can quickly establish here's what's normal, here's the baseline, here's what's going on in this scene. And the more quickly you can do that, the faster you are of identifying that baseline, the sooner you'll be able to turn your attention to really looking for the anomaly. Who stands out from this crowd and really putting the opportunity in your hands instead of the criminals' hands to identify them before they can identify you or before they can conduct their attack.

Especially as you're taking something that's perhaps a new skill for you, behavioral analysis. Looking at not only the behaviors, but understanding what's causing them. It's very important that you go through a very systematic and dedicated process, so, you can really take this from the computer, from the safety of your home or your office and do it in real-time and be as effective as possible on the streets. Thank you.

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Red Cell: Penetration-Testing Your Anchor Point

By: Patrick Van Horne

Establishing and implementing a security plan is not a one-time event. It is a process that requires continuous testing and improvement. Security plans are established at anchor points in order to protect those inside from not only outsiders and non-members, but also from any insiders who have criminal intentions. While I believe that behavioral analysis provides security practitioners with the information and insight needed to accomplish these goals, the concept has also been gaining traction in other areas. In a recent article published in the Wall Street Journal: Risk and Compliance Journal about how to “How To Crack Down On Insider Threats,” Gordon Hannah, a principle in Deloitte & Touche’s Security practice, notes that by adding behavioral profiling to existing security practices, organizations “can effectively neutralize the insider threat and mitigate the risk a single individual can cause.” These insider threats can span the spectrum of violence from being bullied by a coworker, the theft of intellectual property, harassment or even an active shooter scenario. While the threat of insider attackers is widely acknowledged, the ability to proactively identify these workers with dishonest intentions continues to be a challenge. One way that organizations can reduce this risk from insiders is through the practice of penetration testing.

The penetration test, which is commonly used in the context of computer and network security, is a way for security officers to determine how capable they are at preventing both internal and external threats. The goal of a penetration test is to identify where you are vulnerable so that you can later determine how to plug that gap. The process begins by establishing a baseline for the entrance that insiders will have to pass through. By going through the steps and process outlined in “How I Break Down A Video,” we can establish the patterns that are present and have a quantifiable structure to build off of.

Step 1 - Baselining: Where the penetration test requires a focused effort is on the different groups of insiders that use the entrance you are trying to protect. One example is the anchor point that gets established inside of an airport terminal at the individual gates. There are a number of groups that are allowed into the jet-way once their credentials have been verified: passengers, flight attendants, pilots, gate attendants, maintenance staff and the crew that resupplies the planes with the food and drinks. For the gate attendant who serves as the bouncer and sentry at this particular anchor point, her task is to assess each of these groups and know the patterns that each group is supposed to follow. These are the insiders with a legitimate reason for being there, or those trying to appear to be insiders. Consider the following picture taken of the people attempting to board a Southwest Airlines flight.

For the sake of clarity and the specific purpose of the article, I’m not going to elaborate on the complete baseline for this anchor point, but I recommend that you first go through the baselining process and then consider how the following commentary would fit into the larger established norm.

- Passengers stand in line in numerical order in their assigned boarding group. This forced channelization helps the gate attendant observe the behaviors of those about to board by separating them from the other people sitting in the area. Members of this group might show elements of familiarity or unfamiliarity, based on how frequently they fly, but if a passenger shows familiarity with one stage of the boarding process for a Southwest flight, they should show familiarity with all steps in the process. Those familiar with Southwest’s boarding process should also behave in a way that indicates comfort. As passengers line up to enter, the gate attendant could focus her attention on someone displaying familiar cues yet are also uncomfortable. This could be due to an annoying or loud traveller nearby, but the deviation from the familiar and comfortable will identify someone who stands out and can let the attendant know to contact this person and attempt to discover the cause.

- The flight attendants and pilots would also show a high degree of familiarity with the boarding process. This familiarity is common with insiders and they have a great deal of experience in airports. Even if they are in an airport they haven't travelled through before, because all Southwest gates are set up the same, they should be very familiar with the layout and the process for them to check in and board the plane. The pattern of flight attendants would be different from passengers in three areas. First, they won’t be waiting in line like the passengers. Second, the flight attendants would also show that they have a pre-existing relationship with the other members of the crew as many teams work together day in and day out. As they walk up to the gate, I would expect them to be arriving as a group and being friendly towards each other in a way that I would not expect from passengers who were not travelling together. Finally, because flight attendants regularly work the same route, they might also show indicators of familiarity with the gate attendant at the airport. While flight attendants and passengers both have a process for boarding the plane, the processes are different enough that they both required being defined and differentiated.

- When observing the maintenance staff working at the gate, they might not have a clear boarding process the way the passengers and the flight crew do, but they exhibit behaviors that would indicate familiarity. The maintenance staff might not have a pre-existing relationship with the flight crew on a personal level, but may display familiarity based on the responsibilities that each provides while the plane is at the gate. For example, a member of the maintenance crew would know which attendant to talk to if there are any problems, or to let them know when they are complete with their work.

By establishing a baseline and expanding on the behaviors and details for each and every group that has access to an anchor point, you now have a very well-defined norm and can begin planning your penetration test.
**Step 2 – Red Cell:** It is at this point where the red cell comes into play where you can identify the specific behaviors that would deviate from this baseline and begin to outline possible causes for each. If the baseline is comfortable, define why a member of the flight crew would display over-the-top-dominant, uncomfortable or submissive cues. You can also define how a member of these groups might act if questioned or challenged when they are innocent and when they have violent intentions. This red cell phase is the planning time of the penetration test and a chance to look objectively at each possible situation and vulnerability.

**Step 3 - Test:** Once you have established a baseline and red celled how a criminal would behave in different scenarios (dominant, submissive, uncomfortable, comfortable) you can instruct the people tasked with testing the security measures on specific behaviors they should exhibit in their probing attempts. The person responsible for maintaining security at the gate first has to know how to observe and classify each cluster of behavior, and this is an opportunity to coach and mentor the attendant on the behavior she observed of a passenger and how she did (or didn’t) respond. The goal of the actual test is to not determine which group of insiders is the risk, but to determine the vulnerabilities in the bouncer and coach that person to greater effectiveness.

This ability to coach the guards is one additional benefit to defining the role of the bouncer the way we did in the “Identifying Anchor Points” article. By understanding the dominant cluster of behavior, you can mentor your guards (or whoever is tasked with scanning those approaching your building, police department, or patrol base) to determine how intense a display of dominance is required to meet your security goals. If there is an event at the building you are responsible for protecting, maybe you choose a higher-intensity dominance for the special circumstances that wouldn’t be necessary on slower days. By looking at each behavior in the cluster, you can tailor the security posture to meet the needs as well as compensate for guards less capable at observing the subtle behaviors that he should be searching for.

**Testing Your Anchor Points:** As we have noted throughout this issue, treating an anchor point like a habitual area, or simply assuming that security is effective, is extremely risky. Even if your anchor point doesn’t require the same degree of security as an airport terminal, it doesn’t change the need for penetration testing. While an airline is attempting to reduce the risk of flying as much as possible, some office buildings might accept a greater degree of risk because of a lower probability of attack. Regardless of where on the security spectrum you are operating, the penetration test is designed to identify the vulnerabilities that a security plan is supposed to address. How the security gaps that you find in your penetration testing get fixed is a decision often made by top-level leadership, but the objective planning and testing that I’ve talked about in this article and in this e-book provides those leaders with the information needed to make intelligent security decisions.

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