

THREATS INSIDE THE WIRE

PREVENTING GREEN-ON-BLUE ATTACKS

PRODUCED BY:


THE CP JOURNAL
get left of bang and stay there.



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
Dedicated to Captain Matt Manoukian, USMC

A Friend – A Hero – An Inspiration

Born: February 22, 1983

Died: August 10, 2012

Killed in a Green-on-Blue Attack in Afghanistan's Sangin Province



Preface

This book is written for the Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors who are serving overseas and are partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces. The mission to train and develop our Afghan counterparts has been our military strategy for a long time, yet it doesn't come without risk. From 2011 to 2012 the increase in Green-on-Blue incidents rose significantly from previous years and brought the risk associated with these attacks to the forefront of our national attention. Threats inside the wire have the potential to jeopardize what many in our military have fought and died for over the last eleven years.

While the contents of this e-book are focused on the insider attacks that are occurring in Afghanistan, these lessons are not limited solely to that audience. The observations that we are going to talk about allow people to identify those around us who intend to do harm to others, and are applicable in any setting, military or civilian. These exact same observations and principles work in schools, office buildings, movie theaters, shopping malls, churches, restaurants, bars and more. Law enforcement officers, corporate security directors, security guards, human resource executives, and concerned citizens, can pull lessons from the contents of this e-book to minimize the risk they face when it comes to violence.

This book is written with the assumption that readers have a basic understanding of behavioral analysis and topics in The CP Journal. Topics that might require additional reading are identified, and the pages on our website where you can find that information are in the footnotes to simplify your learning and make it as easy as possible for you to prepare for an insider threat. The behavioral observations discussed within this book should be considered to be universal indicators of a person's intentions and emotions. Whether you are deploying to Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, South America, the Horn of Africa, or the streets of New York City or Los Angeles, the behaviors discussed in this book begin to reveal a person's true emotional state, their intentions and their ability to act on those intentions.

If you are new to behavioral analysis, you might find that the observable elements of behavior that we discuss are ones that you have actually been making your entire life. We often let this process remain in a subconscious level of awareness, and we only rarely attempt to consciously take control of this process. Like any muscle, when this skill is not exercised it can cause a person to lose confidence in their assessment at a time when confidence and accuracy are needed the most. The complexity of today's battlefield, regardless of where in the world that may be, demands that we take control of our own personal safety. This means we have to be proactive and dedicate ourselves to consciously searching of our surroundings as a part of our daily routine until it becomes habit.

The goal of this to book is to prevent violence from occurring. I once heard former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Marine General Peter Pace say that if you don't like your environment, you can either change it or learn to operate better within it. The Green-on-Blue threat that our nation's military faces requires that we do a little of both. While we can't completely eliminate the threat our military faces when they are outside the wire, learning to work within the constraints inherent when collaborating across cultures can help us reduce the threats inside the wire. This e-book is designed to tell you how you can set the conditions needed to reduce the risk of these attacks and the observations you can make to take charge of your own safety. Thanks for reading.

Get Left Of Bang And Stay There

Patrick Van Horne
CEO – The CP Journal

Threats Inside The Wire

When Their Presence Is Not A Warning

On November 5, 2009, Army Major Nidal Hassan walked into the Soldier Readiness Center aboard Fort Hood and opened fire with an FN 5.7mm pistol, killing thirteen fellow Soldiers and wounding 30 more.¹ Even though Hassan was a terrorist, inspired by Al-Qaeda and the preaching of Imam Anwar al-Awlaki, I don't want to focus on his ideology in this article. What I care about is how he was able to physically get to the



point where he could carry out his attack. Nidal Hassan belonged in that building. He wore the same uniform as everyone else. He had the ID card and all the credentials. He wasn't posing. He was an insider.

In 2012, our nation's military faced an alarmingly high number of Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan. The military refers to these attacks as Green-on-Blue incidents, where "Green" represents the partnered Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), while "Blue" represents the American military. These attacks are mostly occurring on U.S. bases, spots where the military could traditionally let their guard down, even if just ever so slightly. The incident involving Nidal Hassan and the ANSF present the same security challenge – how can you effectively provide for your own security when the threat wears the same uniform as everyone else?

The problem of Green-on-Blue attacks presents a very complex scenario for the military, as the mission in Afghanistan is to train and develop the ANSF so that they can take charge of their own national security. This is a mission that requires well-developed relationships between the soldiers of each country and a high level of trust between mentor and mentee. If the American military treats every Afghan soldier as a potential threat, taking away their ammunition, searching them at checkpoints, and treating them as second-class citizens, these relationships will be destroyed and the mission will fail. On the other hand, the ANSF can't be treated as harmless, and the military can't completely let their guard down, as that approach would expose our forces to an unacceptable level of risk, and would likewise cause the mission to fail. Because the impact of Green-on-Blue incidents strains this relationship and jeopardizes over eleven years of combat, "threats inside the wire" have attracted the attention at the highest levels of the military and government.

The reality is that a behavioral profiling approach is a key component to identifying and stopping these Green-on-Blue attacks from occurring. The reason I don't want to focus on Nidal Hassan's ideology in this article is because we have members of our military deployed around the world and partnered with foreign militaries with a wide range of beliefs. The motivation to attack in any instance might change depending on the religious, political, or cultural influences in the area, and we need an approach that gets beyond those variables. Regardless of ideology, the behavior of those people

approaching our positions with violent intentions and how we will separate them from the civilians they hide amongst are universal.

No Marine or Soldier should be unprepared to take charge of their own safety and no one should be prevented from learning how to recognize these threats before they deploy. Learning to read the nonverbal cues that a person with violent intentions might display can be the first step to empowering our nation's military to take charge of their personal safety.

Finding Common Ground

These Attacks Are Not Unique

The reason that the previous section is focused on the attack launched by Nidal Hassan in Fort Hood might not be for the reason you would imagine. While this was a terrorist act in nature, the characteristics of his attack actually more closely mirror those of a workplace violence incident. In fact, it meets the exact definition of a Type 3 Workplace Violence incident as defined by OSHA.¹ Nidal Hassan walked into a building where he was an employee/supervisor and committed a violent act against coworkers.




The situation in Afghanistan, where uniformed Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) open fire on their “coworker” American trainers, is no different. To get further and further left of bang², we first need to understand what is

driving ANSF to conduct these acts. It's a common misconception that these attacks are terrorism and a result of the Taliban infiltrating the ANSF. In reality, according to a 2012 NATO report about insider attacks, only about 10% of these attacks are a result of the Taliban infiltrating the ANSF ranks.ⁱⁱ One reason that this number is such a slim percentage of the total attacks is due to the fact that fighting an insurgency is fighting a war of information and intelligence. The side with the greatest intelligence and influence has a clear advantage. If the Taliban were successful in getting an agent into the ANSF, it wouldn't be in their best interest to lose that asset, as he would likely be killed or captured following an attack on American soldiers. The risk of losing an asset on the

¹ I would like to state that my analysis of the Fort Hood shooting resembling a Workplace Violence incident is solely for the purpose of looking at the causes of the Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan. In my opinion, due to Nidal Hassan's confirmed conversations with Al-Qaeda, the government's ruling regarding the attack should be and instead be classified as an act of terror. The families of those victims should receive the same benefits as a Marine or Soldier killed in combat, regardless of the location of the battlefield.

² Left of Bang refers to the observation of the pre-event indicators necessary to intervene and taking the proactive steps to prevent violence from occurring.



inside who could provide information about future missions, the chain of command, security vulnerabilities, etc., would not outweigh the benefit of killing a handful of Americans.

The cause for ninety percent of the Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan is not terrorism, but is instead the result of personal disagreements between the members of the partnered militaries. In other words, they are revenge attacks. These could occur when a member of the ANSF becomes angry over the way he is being treated by the Americans. It could be that they are tired of seeing their countrymen being searched at checkpoints or having their houses raided at night. In a Pashtunwali culture that is focused on maintaining honor, in their eyes, any attack on that honor has to be avenged. This path to violence is very similar to assaults in the workplace that we experience here in America, whether they are former employees laid off and angry at their former employer, an employee who has been humiliated by another in front of their peers, or a coworker with a substance abuse issue who suddenly snaps. This puts the cause for an attack on the lower end of Maslow's Hierarchy and can make some of these incidents more predictable and more preventable.

If we look at these attacks through this lens of workplace violence, that they are personal in nature and caused by breakdowns in relationships, it can help us remove some of the biases from our decisions. By finding common ground between the likely causes of these attacks and the similarity to workplace violence incidents here in America, we can find commonalities and begin to focus on the indicators that would lead us to the proactive identification of a threat. We aren't going to focus on personal iconography (clothing, tattoos, jewelry, etc.) because it is likely that the potential attacker will look like everyone else on the base. The behavioral domains of Kinesics, Biometrics, and Proxemics will play a greater role in separating these individuals from the crowd.

Amy Cuddy, a social psychologist and professor at Harvard Business School, has written that people are constantly analyzing others in order to determine their "intentions and capabilities."ⁱⁱⁱ The only way that we can get past our biases and accurately judge a person is to find indicators that provide a true eye into these intentions and capabilities. We can do this through the lens of behavior. In Afghanistan we often look past the village elder because we see him as old in age, and therefore incapable of doing any harm. In reality he is probably the most experienced warrior in that village. Our preconceived notion was an inaccurate bias. This same concept applies to the Green-on-Blue threat. Just because someone is wearing a uniform isn't an excuse for us to fail to notice the indicators of what their intentions are.

By identifying the cause for threats inside the wire as being personal in nature, we can begin to get Left of Bang by being aware of the stresses experienced in combat, and seeking to build personal bonds between American and Afghan soldiers. The reason behind this isn't to be nice for the sake of being nice, but as a means to make insider threats a manageable challenge and begin reducing the number of potential attackers.

The Approach

How To Look At People Closing The Distance

The approach always precedes the attack. It has to, and Green-on-Blue attacks are no different. An attacker must get closer to his target in order to be successful. This approach is going to cause that person to stand out from the baseline. Any time a person is drawn towards you or you are drawn towards other people, objects or locations, we refer to this dynamic as the Proxemic Pull.⁴

The reason that attackers need to close the distance between themselves and their target is because they intuitively understand the principle that Proximity Negates Skill. If you can't shoot someone from 500 yards away, you have to get within a range where you can hit your target. If you don't have a gun, you need to get within knife striking range. If you don't have the skill or the ability to kill with a great degree of standoff, you have to get within a closer proximity to compensate and be successful.




The consequences for failing to identify an insider threat are extremely high and, while the fact that attackers are moving closer to Marines or Soldiers can make stopping these attacks more challenging

(a closer attacker reduces the amount of time available to react and limits the number of options available for dealing with the threat) it also simplifies the problem. These Proxemic Pulls allow us to begin our analysis of the intentions of people who are approaching us and determine if they fit the baseline or are an anomaly.

Proxemic Pulls are going to be the context that we will place all of our Green-on-Blue observations into, and can be thought of as adding physical movement to the Interested Cluster⁵ of behavior. The baseline for a Proxemic Pull is a positive encounter, as you typically only approach things that you have a high degree of interest in. This makes our

⁴ For more information on Proxemic Pull baselines and anomalies, visit: <http://www.cp-journal.com/the-ugly-side-of-proxemic-pulls/>

⁵ For a full list of cues in the interested cluster, visit: <http://www.cp-journal.com/understanding-body-language-interested-vs-uninterested/>



hunt for anomalies to be centered on the nonverbal cues we might expect to see from a person approaching us with violent intentions.

A criminal will approach his target for one of two reasons. The first is to conduct the attack itself and the second would be to conduct surveillance in preparation for their planned attack. Regardless of whether he is approaching in order to conduct surveillance or conduct an attack, Marines should initially assess where a member of the ANSF has focused their interest. Are they observing/approaching a habitual area or an anchor point?

Why Attack An Anchor Point?

An anchor point is a place where people go to feel safe. It is a place that not just anyone can come or go into freely, but a place where you have to meet some pre-existing criteria to gain access. In Afghanistan, an American anchor point could be the Combat Operations Center (COC) where only people who have a security clearance or are directly involved in the planning and execution of missions are allowed to be. Another American anchor point could be the berthing areas that are prohibited to the ANSF. These places are usually off limits to the ANSF.

In a Green-on-Blue situation, attacking an anchor point would likely show a lack of planning on the part of the attacker. Attacking here would mean making your intentions clear right from the beginning because, as soon as the ANSF soldier is seen, Americans would realize something was wrong. This would be like storming into your boss's office uninvited. It is pretty obvious what your intentions are and it won't end well. Should an ANSF soldier decide to conduct his attack on an anchor point, it is unlikely that he will make it out alive.

Attacking anchor points might show elements of rage, where emotion clouds the decision-making process to the point where the attacker is no longer worried about the inherent risk. This is why I say that attacking an anchor point would show that the attack was unplanned, because escape after the attack is unlikely or at the minimum will be very difficult. If you assess the elements of an insider attack from purely a military perspective, you would realize that units spend a great deal of time planning an attack on an enemy's anchor point because it has the ability to deliver a decisive victory. If Green-on-Blue attacks were the result of Taliban planning and influence, my assessment about the degree of planning that went into an attack would change. Using the statistics from the introductory chapter, I would assess that insider attacks are likely to have a lesser degree of planning because of the spur of the moment nature due to attacking out of rage, which may make American anchor points the target of the aggression.

Why Attack In A Habitual Area?


In contrast to attacking an anchor point, an attacker who decides to conduct his assault in a habitual area likely put more thought into his plan. Because a habitual area is a place where anyone can come or go, it would be easier for someone with violent intentions to get closer to their target undetected, as an ANSF member would not be considered suspicious solely because he is present. Habitual areas could include places like:

- The chow-hall where soldiers are already allowed to eat
- Training ranges where the ANSF are already expected to have their weapons and ammunition on their person
- Possibly on patrol, where people are searching for *outside* threats, and would be more susceptible to a threat from the inside

An attacker will likely have a greater degree of surprise while attacking in a habitual area than if they were approaching an anchor point as a Marine's attention should be focused on external threats. This element of surprise also opens the door to the chance of an attacking ANSF soldier surviving the assault and possibly escaping once the attack is complete. In the workplace violence incident that occurred outside of the Empire State Building in August 2012, the attacker went to his former business to kill the boss that fired him. Instead of approaching his boss inside of the office, the confrontation was on the street, a habitual area. This allowed the attacker to flee a few blocks before being shot by police officers. Even though the shooter's escape was ultimately unsuccessful, by attacking in a habitual area, he had the opportunity to get away. If the shooter had chosen the boss's office as the location for the attack, an anchor point, this would escape would have been much more difficult.



The Proxemic Pull is *the context* that we will need to place threat recognition observations into. As people approach either habitual areas or anchor points, assessing that person's nonverbal behavior is how we will be able to determine if their intentions are legitimate or violent. Their behavior is what will determine if that person fits the baseline or is classified as an anomaly.



The Cues and The Clusters

The Behaviors We Are Looking For

In the last chapter, we established that the context for insider attacks is the Proxemic Pull – the approaching attacker. When we look at Green-on-Blue attacks, the observations we are going to make at the most basic level are going to be grounded in the nonverbal cues – *the clusters*. This is what is going to make the attacker stand out from the baseline and let us identify him hiding in the crowd.

The four body language clusters that we will look at are the ones that we can directly tie to the body's freeze, flight or fight response to stress. There is not one cue that is guaranteed to be an infallible sign that a threat might be present, but together we can make educated assessments about a person's emotions and intentions. Every situation is going to be different, but we can look at some possible causes for each of the four clusters.

The Dominant Cluster


Looking back at the section "Finding Common Ground," remember that Green-on-Blue attacks are often personal in nature, which could lead the attacker to betray his intentions by showing elements of rage. The Dominant Cluster is the body's manifestation of the fight response, and an attacker may start to display these cues as their body prepares for the upcoming fight.⁶ Especially on a military base, there is sure to be a certain degree of dominance as a result of rank that is naturally displayed, especially from the officers, SNCOs, etc. That presence should be part of your baseline. Because of that element in the baseline, we are looking for the signs that indicate dominant body language that goes beyond authority and power, but also indicate that a person is preparing to attack.

The Submissive Cluster

If a potential attacker is worried that showing dominant cues will cause them to get caught before they get to their target, they may go overboard in trying not to show aggression. Therefore, they would begin giving off the cues from the Submissive Cluster.

Think about a time when you were pulled over in your car by a cop after you knew you did something wrong, like blowing through a stop sign. How long did it take for you to become the most respectful person in the world? "Yes sir." "No sir." "I promise to never do it again, sir." You might take on a submissive posture, such as keeping your shoulders lowered, hands in your lap, or legs held together, to show that you are sorry or that you won't do it again, if you think it is your best chance of getting out of a ticket.

⁶ For a full list of cues in the Dominant and Submissive Clusters, visit: www.cp-journal.com/understanding-body-language-dominant-vs-submissive/



The Submissive Cluster is the absence of the fight response and could be indicative of someone trying to hide something. For the Alpha males out there reading this and saying, “That would never be me! I would tell the cop that I wasn’t speeding and stand up for myself,” that’s fine too. Keep in mind that the response to the threat is going to be unique to you. That is why we look at dominant and submissive and uncomfortable cues that deviate from the baseline.

The Uncomfortable Cluster

You might see elements of the Uncomfortable Cluster⁷ in a person less confident in their attack. I say less confident because they might be nervous that they are going to get caught before they get to the target, worried that they will fail, worried about what will happen to their family, worried what it is going to feel like to get shot once the attack begins, or a variety of other reasons.

This would be in stark contrast to the aggression of the Dominant Cluster. That nervous or anxious energy could manifest itself on the body in Pacifying Behavior,⁸ or even in verbal cues such as a high rate of speech. Because this is the way the body displays the flight response, look for cues that show they are either nervous (wanting to leave) or protecting themselves (establishing barriers.)

Just as certain dominant cues are expected on a military base, there is a certain degree of discomfort to be expected on a military base. Someone is always just about to get yelled at. No patrol is ever perfect and a soldier might be nervous about getting called out during the patrol after action review. A moderate level of discomfort is probably part of your baseline, but don’t hesitate to contact someone if you think that the pacifying behavior you are observing doesn’t fit the baseline and warrants further attention.

The Comfortable Cluster

The Comfortable Cluster should very often be the baseline for a military base unless there are high tensions between the Afghan and American Security Forces. The base is an anchor point for soldiers or Marines; it is a place where they are in relative safety because not everyone is let in. Because the threats inside of a base should be minimal, people should be relaxed, which would cause the body to shift into the Comfortable Cluster. Comfort should be the baseline for the base, which is why the dominant, submissive, and uncomfortable clusters are used to identify anomalies. Like every cluster, it has to be taken in context – if a person is getting screamed at and shows no sign of transitioning from comfort to another cluster, the lack of change could be an indicator that something is not right as well.

⁷ For a full list of cues in the Uncomfortable and Comfortable Clusters, visit: www.cp-journal.com/2011/11/understanding-body-language-comfortable-vs-uncomfortable/

⁸ For an explanation of pacifying behavior, visit: www.cp-journal.com/2012/03/a-look-at-pacifying-behaviors-uncovering-uncomfortable-people/

Keep In Mind

Assigning someone to one of these clusters does not make them an anomaly. People cycle through all of these clusters on a normal day. Each of these clusters is part of everyday life. These clusters are only the “observation” portion of the process, and are focused on the science behind behavioral analysis. Once you have accurately classified someone as exhibiting these cues, you then have to determine if that cluster of behavior fits the baseline or not. That is where the analysis, your judgment and your experience come into play.

Bringing This Behavior To The Forefront

Setting The Conditions That You Want

Any body language that is universal and uncontrollable is a result of the limbic system.⁹ If a person doesn't perceive a threat (like getting caught before the shooter can conduct his attack) they won't give off any cues that could alert you. Setting the conditions for successful violence intervention means creating stress conditions that would cause a person to respond.

While on patrol, in a habitual area, you are not able to completely control your surroundings. These are public areas and threats are high. However, when you return to base, that is your turf where you can set the conditions needed to elicit certain behavior, and, in-turn, improve your security.


During one of my deployments to Iraq, my company was partnered with an Iraqi police unit. We were on the same camp, which was small, but were billeted on opposite sides of the outpost. There was a dirt berm dividing the camp with a single break in the berm that was to be used as the path to move back and forth (the camp was originally much smaller and later expanded to house the Iraqi police.)



That one break in the berm created a choke point that every Iraqi police officer had to walk through as they came to our side of the camp. What the choke point offered was a single place to observe people coming and going into an area. By concentrating people through a single point of entry, there will be more people available to observe and help you establish a baseline, and also help you identify the anomalies.

Think about how the TSA establishes their checkpoints in an airport. They channel every passenger into a line, allowing for individual comparison against the other people

⁹ For an explanation about how the Limbic System influences our nonverbal communication, visit: www.cp-journal.com/how-the-brain-controls-behavior/



in line. There is the first agent who is responsible for ensuring you have your ticket, ID and asking some basic questions. If you were to attempt to get through the checkpoint with either a fake ID or forged ticket, a criminal could perceive this agent as a threat because he doesn't know exactly what the agent is looking for. If the agent notices any change in a traveller's behavior during the initial conversation, or that a person was clearly more uncomfortable than the other passengers, that agent now has information that he can use to confidently refer that traveler for a more detailed search. Once a traveler has gotten past the initial agent, their baggage is now scanned and searched. If a criminal is attempting to smuggle a weapon through the checkpoint, the x-ray scanner poses a threat, and could cause a person to show one of the behavioral clusters described in the last chapter until their baggage clears the security checkpoint.

The same security concepts used by the TSA can be integrated into the security posts and choke points that a Marine or Soldier mans inside of their base. A checkpoint where ANSF members are going to be searched does not need to be conducted intrusively to be effective. Even if the Marine standing post just shakes the hands and hugs the ANSF soldier as they enter, he is serving as a barrier that everyone has to get through. That Marine becomes a visible sign of authority and can impose the stressor necessary to elicit a response from a potential attacker. This allows the Marine on post to focus his attention on specific people who have displayed behavior that doesn't fit the baseline.


This is just one example of steps that can be taken to elicit behavioral responses. I challenge you to find many creative ways to set the same conditions. This allows for effective security without doing anything to strain the relationship between your partnered forces. There might be a time when you have to take more aggressive action in order to ensure your own security, but you don't want to burn that bridge until it is absolutely necessary. Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are a thinking man's game – get creative.

Finding The Truth

Once The Anomaly Has Been Identified

Behavioral analysis doesn't make you a mind reader. Observing someone who is showing cues from the Uncomfortable Cluster only means that they are uncomfortable. That observation alone doesn't guarantee that they are about to commit a Green-on-Blue attack, but it does mean that we can begin putting together a plan and go into Condition Orange.¹⁰ Unless the person is an obvious and immediate threat (brandishing a weapon, pointing a weapon, making threats) we still need more information to determine if the person intends to harm others or not. If you were to look at the TSA checkpoint as an example, an old woman who is nervous about going through

¹⁰ For an explanation about the what Condition Orange provides, visit: www.cp-journal.com/are-you-fighting-reactively-the-importance-of-condition-orange/



security because it is her first time flying in a decade could give off the same exact cues as a smuggler who is nervously trying to get a suitcase full of heroin onto the plane. The only way we can reduce the false positives (the old woman) and focus our attention on people who truly warrant our attention (the smuggler) and stop insider attacks, is to find the reason for their behavior. To do this, we have to start a conversation with them. We call this conversation a contact.

The “contact” provides the information you need so that you can determine why a person you originally classified as an anomaly was acting the way you observed. This person has already gotten your attention, now you must figure out the cause. This human intelligence (HUMINT) is key to stopping Threats Inside the Wire.


Contacting an anomaly isn’t an intrusive interrogation, but it also isn’t purposeless small talk. Think of the contact as a conversation with a purpose. The purpose is to determine whether the individual under suspicion is a threat or not. The situation, your natural conversational style, and your relationship with the person you are talking to, are all going to affect how to best attain the information you are after. Because this makes each conversation a little different from the last, here are some keys to a good contact.

Get Them Talking

A contact is a situation where you need to gain information. This requires voluntary cooperation from the person who has that information. If you approach the person in the wrong way or are overly confrontational, they could simply walk away from you, leaving you right back at ground zero. This can be a challenge sometimes overseas, especially because of cultural differences between Americans and Afghans. I could make a solid argument that the one common characteristic across all members of the American military is “blunt.” We like to get to the point.

While being blunt often works well with junior Marines or soldiers who can’t walk away from someone senior to them, it is rarely conducive to a normal conversation amongst equals. If you are too blunt or accusatory during your contact, the person you have contacted isn’t going to open up; he is just going to walk away. This doesn’t get you the truth.

During the conversation, make sure you are asking open-ended questions that require more than just a simple “yes” or “no” response. The longer the person is talking, the more time you have to observe their behavior and decide if the anomaly is a threat or a false positive. This is why we say a contact should not be an intrusive set of questions. We need to get them to voluntarily open up. This is one way you can set the conditions for your own success.



Make them Comfortable

The goal is to get an anomaly into the Comfortable Cluster as early as possible in the conversation. Whenever possible, establish rapport with the person so they no longer perceive you as a threat. You will know when you have succeeded as you will see their body language open up, relax, and become comfortable in the situation. The reason you want to do this is so that you can easily observe changes out of the cluster. It is easier to confidently observe a shift from “Comfortable to Uncomfortable” than it is to see someone escalate from “mild discomfort to moderate discomfort.” Having the person relax at the beginning of the conversation works in your favor.


Let Body Language Be The Guide

As the conversation transitions from topic to topic, you are going to look for any changes in behavior. If you see the person you are talking to shift from Comfortable to any of the other clusters, it could indicate that there is something about that topic that makes them worried.

Even though changes in the person’s body language will be the indicators that you will observe, and that will alert you to something being wrong, it is the topic being discussed that you will want to take note of. If you remember Roger Clemens testifying in front of Congress about steroid use, his nonverbal behavior during the interview highlights this dynamic. When he was talking about baseball, his body language was in the Comfortable Cluster. He was very relaxed, as it was a topic that he could talk about indefinitely. However, when the questions turned to steroids, he shifted into the Uncomfortable Cluster as you could see him lick his lips and begin shifting around in his chair. The shift from the Comfortable Cluster to the Uncomfortable Cluster is what we can observe, but it is the topic of steroid use that we will want to investigate further.

Follow Up

When you identify a topic that you want to come back to (we refer to them as Repeat Topics), find a creative way to readdress the topic later in the conversation. You do this to either draw out the facts you are after or to confirm your earlier assessment that it is that specific topic that worries your subject. The same concept applies to vague answers. Unless you are interviewing a politician, it is normal to expect an actual answer to your questions during a conversation. If you feel that an answer was avoiding or deflecting away from the topic you are after, don’t end the conversation before getting a solid or thorough response.



This section is labeled “Finding The Truth” because that is the goal – to get the information you need to make an informed decision. This is about confirming whether someone is threatening or not, not about detecting deception. I distinguish between finding the truth and uncovering deceit because learning that you are being lied to only helps you to know that you don’t have the truth. It lets you eliminate a possibility, but it doesn’t give you the facts that you need. Don’t stop digging if you think the answer is going to be the difference between success and failure. Keep in mind that Green-on-Blue attacks are often a result of breakdowns in relationships, which at times can be difficult or awkward to talk about. However, following up is a key step to ensuring your security.

Contact Everyone

I recommend that you talk to just about every single person that you can when you identify someone as an anomaly. When you have the least amount of information available, therefore a high degree of uncertainty, every piece of new information has a huge impact on reducing that uncertainty and helping you develop the baseline. The more conversations you have and the more information you gain is only going to help you expand your understanding and help you get closer to finding the truth.

The other reason to contact as many people as you can in your daily life is that it is a skill that requires practice. To become adept at questioning people while also looking for any changes in behavior takes some effort, and it is not something that will develop overnight. Before you deploy and find yourself in a situation where you need the ability to effectively contact someone who could also be a potential threat, you need to practice, practice, practice.

This Is The Last Ten Yards

Reading human behavior is going to get you most of the way down the field. It will let you know who needs to be talked to, explain why that person stood out from the crowd, determine what potential control questions will fit the situation, and help you develop a list of potential reasons why someone is acting the way you observed. However it doesn’t complete the threat recognition process. Behavioral analysis might make the person you are talking to think that you are a mind reader, as you will pick up on the cues they are trying to hide, but we know that isn’t the case. While the observation is the heavy lifting that has to be done to get the process started, the only way you can confirm those observations and stop an insider attack before it occurs is to gather the information from a conversation. There is no substitute for human intelligence and no amount of technology that will ever replace it, but it does take work to hone the skill.

Trust Your Instincts

You've Been Doing This Your Whole Life

In early January of 2013, the *New York Times* published an article^{iv} that highlighted the path an Afghan Soldier took to go from a soldier and partner of Americans, to the perpetrator of a Green-on-Blue insider attack. The previous chapters in this book discuss proactive steps and observations that Marines, Soldiers and civilian contractors can take while deployed to ensure their safety, but there is still one critical principle.

In combat if something feels wrong, it is wrong.


While deployed, the stakes for a member of our military are so high that they cannot afford the risk associated with second-guessing themselves. Our limbic system – the unconscious part of our brain that is focused on ensuring our survival – has evolved to help us survive the predators we have faced throughout history, and it isn't something that should be ignored. As humans, we have a way of misunderstanding or mislabeling



the way our brain is telling us there is something wrong. Whether we call it a hunch, a gut feeling, or a woman's intuition, these are the indicators that your body has begun preparing for the fight or flight response.

What is really happening when a person gets that “gut feeling” is that information is coming in from one or all of your senses, and much of that information gets sent straight to your limbic system for processing. Your amygdala (what focuses your attention) and hippocampus (what coordinates memory storage) bounce this information off of each other at an incredibly high rate of speed to determine if what you perceive could be harmful to you, based on past experiences. What this means is that your brain is unconsciously looking for patterns that are important to your safety before you are even consciously aware of it. If the answer is yes, that something is wrong and requires action, your body will begin preparing for fight or flight before this information has been transferred to your pre-frontal cortex and conscious awareness.

This is where your intuition comes from and allows you to make snap judgments based on these patterns. It is why experienced soldiers, Marines and police officers are considered more survivable in combat than their novice peers, because they have a larger “database” of experiences for their limbic system to compare the current situation to.



Many people naturally and initially observe situations from the big picture, and then make their way down to the fine details. We see the forest first and then make our way down to the trees. Think about that fact using the domains.¹¹ We start with an assessment about the Atmospherics for an area, then transition to Geographics, then look at the groups of people, and then finally focus our attention on individual people. We execute this process quickly and unconsciously when entering a new area so that we can make sense of our surroundings as a whole before focusing our attention on the details.

The point is that deployed members of our military can and should believe in their “gut” when it alerts them to something being off. Don’t fight the instinct to heighten your level of alertness and awareness. Confidently investigate every single thing that doesn’t make sense or that causes you to feel uneasy, because the cost for incorrectly assuming that everything is safe or normal is far too high.¹²

If you are a younger or less experienced Marine or Soldier, don’t feel that the instinctual observations of more experienced peers are outside of the realm of possibility for you. That is why The CP Journal exists. By learning to observe specific nonverbal cues and analyze human behavior in a systematic manner, you can attain this level of experience in a relatively short amount of time.

Final Thoughts

I couldn’t be more proud of those who continue to serve our country, and I thank you for your commitment to voluntarily step up to this task. The Green-on-Blue threat challenges the success that you have worked so hard towards for more than a decade. With training, understanding, and a dedicated effort to reduce that risk, it can become manageable to the point where it becomes just another aspect of military life. Understanding our environment allows us to prepare to control it and thrive within it.

Never Forget – Never Quit – Semper Fidelis

Patrick Van Horne

¹¹ For an explanation about each of the six domains, visit: <http://bit.ly/16zFoRe>

¹² I recommend Gavin de Becker’s book *The Gift of Fear* if you want to learn more about how dangerous denying this instinct can be.

Company Overview

The CP Journal is a Veteran Owned Small Business. The CP Journal provides training seminars and professional consultation in behavioral analysis and threat recognition to the military, law enforcement and private security industry. This training empowers our nation's protectors to take proactive action against those with violent intentions by learning to observe, classify and communicate the behavior of others. This stops violent events from occurring.

The CP Journal also provides training behavioral analysis to the private sector. This includes threat recognition to non-security focused companies designed to prevent workplace and school violence. Business professionals can improve the effectiveness of their operations by learning to read and understand the nonverbal behavior of counterparts, especially in sales and negotiation settings.

The CP Journal provides follow on resources to our students in the form of online games, a library of resources, articles, video training, and book reviews that relate to behavioral analysis and predictive profiling.

To learn more about their values and training, visit: www.cp-journal.com

Questions or comments regarding this proposal can be directed to Patrick Van Horne at: Patrick@cp-journal.com



About the Author

Patrick Van Horne is the Founder and CEO of The CP Journal. As a former Marine Corps Infantry Officer, Patrick served as a Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, and Company Commander, and completed multiple deployments to Iraq. Following his time in the Fleet Marine Corps, he was selected to become the officer in charge of a mobile training team providing instruction to deploying Marines units in the Combat Hunter Program.

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